The  Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and Legislatures by Garza, Sonya C.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 69 | Number 4
Summer 2009
The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for
State Courts and Legislatures
Sonya C. Garza
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and Legislatures, 69 La. L. Rev. (2009)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol69/iss4/6
The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State
Courts and Legislatures
Sonya C. Garza*
I. THE DEBATE OVER THE FEDERALIZATION OF FAMILY LAW
One of the biggest controversies in family law today stems
from the lack of uniformity in laws across jurisdictions. Most
people assume there has always been a lack of involvement in
family law by the federal courts. Prior to the advent of modem
family law statutes, the U.S. Supreme Court stated "the whole
subject of domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States."1 However, without the "federal government's role
in the regulation of the family,' 2 family law would not exist as it
does today. Only recently have scholars started to discuss the
impact of federal law in shaping the development of family law.
Historically, all branches of the federal government were "actively
engaged in creating and enforcing laws that bore directly on
families," often using "uniform federal standards" to do so. For
example, a pension program for the survivors of Revolutionary
War veterans required rules on who could qualify as a spouse or
child of the deceased veteran.
In addition, the idea of state sovereignty has often been used
"as a theory of convenience, strategically invoked and easily
dismissed or ignored" in an effort to allow the federal government
more flexibility to enter into the realm of family law at its
discretion.5 As Susan Collins points out, in the
women's suffrage campaign, polygamy, liberalized divorce
laws, and interracial marriage attracted national attention as
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1. Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
2. Kristin A. Collins, Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradition of
Federal Family Law and the Invention of States' Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REv.
1761, 1765 (2005).
3. Id. at 1767.
4. Id. at 1782.
5. Id. at 1768.
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threats to the traditional family. In the course of debates
over proposed regulatory responses, the proper place of the
family in the national republic emerged as a heavily
contested issue, and the notion that domestic relations fall
under the exclusive authority of the states took shape and
gained force as a theory of federalism.
6
The same moral debate continues to occur at the national level
today when discussing same-sex marriage, abortion, and as
exemplified in this Article, parental rights.
However, the federal courts continue to treat matters of family
law with much disdain. 8 One of the more recent examples is the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison.9 In
Morrison, the Court held that a provision of the Violence Against
Women Act was unconstitutional due to the "need to distinguish
'between what is truly national and what is truly local."' In the
majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist assumed the federal
government lacks any role in family law issues. If Congress may
criminalize violence against women--due to its aggregate
economic effect-under the Commerce Clause, then Congress may
constitutionally regulate "family law and other areas of traditional
state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and
child rearin on the national economy is undoubtedly
significant."' Justice Scalia uses the same rationale favoring state
control of family law matters or as he sometimes defines such
matters as those of "morality"11 in his majority opinion in Town of
Castle Rock v. Gonzales12 and dissenting opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas.
13
Contrary to these statements by the Supreme Court, there is
actually a long "history of the federal government's role in crafting
6. Id. Collins states that the use of this argument "is not because the state
sovereignty paradigm is necessarily associated with a specific ideological
agenda, but because its history demonstrates it to be a theory of convenience,
rather than a meaningful or principled limit on federal power." Id. at 1768-69.
7. See, e.g., Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. §
1738C (2006); Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006);
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (discussing the constitutionality of the
Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act).
8. See Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 175,
176-77 (2000) (stating that "[t]his Article acknowledges that in the academic
world, constitutional law is King and family law is Cinderella's sister").
9. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10. Id. at 617.
11. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003).
12. 54 U.S. 748 (2005).
13. 539 U.S. at 565.
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domestic relations law and policy. ' 14 While "states have primary
responsibility for the regulation of families . . . the federal
government has considerable authority to intervene and often has
done so." 15 However, when the federal government does choose to
enter into the realm of family law, as the Supreme Court did in
Troxel v. Granville,16 states do not understand the implications.
After federal action, state laws often remain unchanged or
inadequately amended, leaving state statutes subject to invalidation
by the federal courts. More importantly, federal court decisions
that were intended to be directly applicable to the entire nation, or
at the very least to serve as guidelines for state legislative reforms,
lead to completely different laws across state boundaries.
This Article does not argue for or against the federalization of
family law but demonstrates why the debate exists and proposes a
solution to one issue-third-party visitation-within this controversy.
While many scholars have offered suggestions in the past to repair
the problems created in the Troxel decision, 17 no one has proposed
a uniform solution-a law which all states may use as guidance in
redrafting their own third-party visitation statutes. This Article
begins by discussing the history of parental rights, the oldest
recognized fundamental right, in Part II. Part III addresses the
history of third-party visitation statutes. Part IV analyzes the
Troxel opinion in its entirety. Part V discusses the states' judicial
and legislative responses to the Court's decision and the varying
nature of third-party visitation statutes across the country. Part VI
briefly discusses an alternative for state use of third-party visitation
statutes as they currently function to argue why a uniform statute is
so important. Part VII concludes by offering a solution to the
Troxel puzzle by proposing the adoption of uniform third-party
visitation legislation by states.
14. Collins, supra note 2, at 1765.
15. Law, supra note 8, at 184.
16. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
17. Nancy Levit, Federalization of Family Law: A Supplemental Annotated
Bibliography, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 351 (2007) (citing Solangel
Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't Know Best: Quasi-Parents and
Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REv. 865 (2003)
(urging that proof that a third party has been acting as a parent should be enough
to defeat any "special weight" given to a parent's decision to deny visitation,
absent exceptional circumstances); Stephen A. Newman, Grandparent Visitation
Claims: Assessing Multiple Harms of Litigation to Families and Children, 13
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 21 (2003) (arguing that because of the harm to children from
the effects of intergenerational litigation, courts should afford dispositive weight
to a parent's decision unless the grandparent has clear and convincing evidence
of probable harm to the child)).
2009] 929
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II. THE HISTORY OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The constitutionally protected right to control the care of one's
children was first recognized in the 1920s in the United States
Supreme Court decisions of Meyer v. Nebraska8 and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.19 Meyer and Pierce are "often seen as the only
two remaining Lochner-era substantive due process cases that are
still good law today.",20 In Meyer, Robert Meyer, an instructor at
the Zion Parochial School, was convicted under a Nebraska statute
that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages in schools until a
student successfully completed eighth grade. Meyer challenged the
law as a deprivation of teachers' and parents' liberty without due
process of law.2' While the Court conceded that the purpose of the
statute was within the reasonable police powers of the state, the
Court ultimately held that the law infringed on individual liberty,
which, amongst many things, protects an individual's "right to...
marry, establish a home and bring up children,.., and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.,
22
In Pierce, the Court reiterated the holding in Meyer. At issue in
Pierce was an Oregon Compulsory Education Act, which required
parents to send their children between the ages of eight and sixteen
to a public school within their residential district.23 Again,
following the decision in Meyer, the Court held that the Act
"unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control."24
Meyer and Pierce were cited repeatedly in numerous Supreme
Court decisions that followed.25 In addition, parental rights were
18. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
19. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
20. See Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental Rights:
From Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 72
(2006).
21. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396.
22. Id. at 399.
23. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530-31.
24. Id. at 534-35.
25. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that with only a
screening of a neutral fact-finder, parent can institutionalize their child based on
a right to parental decision-making and the presumption that a parent acts in a
child's best interests); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that a
compulsory school attendance statute violated Amish parents' right to control
the upbringing of their children and the parents' right to free exercise of
religion); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding a child labor
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seen as the "very foundation of social order."26 Courts have always
been hesitant to involve themselves in matters of the family or to
allow other branches to interfere since the home has always been
shielded by privacy. The assumption has been that the family itself
is better equipped to deal with internal conflict and that
government interference only leads to more disruption. Even in the
early 1990s, when third-party visitation statutes existed in all
states, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence continued to reflect a
hands-off approach to the family. 7 In addition, it has often been
argued in custody disputes that government recognition of the
rights of a third party would create more conflict and also lead to a
"detrimental impact [on] the child[ren]. ' 28
However, the strength of the fundamental parental right of
care, custody, and control in current constitutional family law
jurisprudence was unclear until Troxel v. Granville.29 In 2000, the
Supreme Court directly addressed a parent's fundamental right in
the context of the state of Washington's grandparent visitation
statute. Since 2000, family law practitioners and, more importantly,
judges have continued to struggle with the status and
constitutionality of existing third-party visitation statutes. Further,
the number of third parties, not just grandparents and relatives, who
could potentially petition for visitation is growing exponentially
given the changing dynamic of the family. Troxel was much needed
when the case was decided, but the ultimate holding resolved very
little for states.
III. THE HISTORY OF THIRD-PARTY VISITATION STATUTES
"The nationwide enactment of nonparental visitation statutes is
assuredly due, in some part, to the States' recognition of [the]
changing realities of the American family., 30 State legislatures
law stating that while there is a right to parental decision-making it is not
absolute).
26. Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of Troxel v.
Granville and the Courts' Reluctance to Declare Grandparent Visitation
Statutes Unconstitutional, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 14, 15-16 (2003).
27. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(striking down a spousal notification requirement due to desire to promote
familial harmony and avoid the creation of more domestic conflict).
28. Susan Tomaine, Troxel v. Granville: Protecting Fundamental Parental
Rights While Recognizing Changes in the American Family, 50 CATH. L. REV.
731, 737 (2001).
29. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
30. Id. at 64.
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began drafting statutes allowing for third parties to petition for
visitation rights of minors in the late 1960s for this exact reason-
the changing composition and dynamic of family. Prior to Troxel,
all states had third-party visitation statutes. 31 Even after Troxel v.
Granville seemed to suggest third parties lacked all rights to
petition for visitation, all states continue to have legislation that
allows grandparents or other third parties to seek visitation.32
During the latter part of the century the country began
experiencing high divorce rates. 33 As a result, single parenthood
and "blended families" became more common.3  Women and
mothers began entering the workforce in large numbers. 35 State
legislatures began recognizing the changing nature of the family by
adopting third-party visitation statutes. Justice O'Connor addressed
the advent of grandparent visitation statutes due to the changing
dynamics of the family in her Troxel plurality opinion:
The demographic changes of the past century make it
difficult to speak of an average American family. The
composition of families varies greatly from household to
household. While many children may have two married
parents and grandparents who visit regularly, many other
children are raised in single-parent households. In 1996,
children living with only one parent accounted for 28
percent of all children under age 18 in the United States.
Understandably, in these single-parent households, persons
outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing
frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing. In
many cases, grandparents play an important role. For
example, in 1998, approximately 4 million children-or 5.6
percent of all children under the age of 18-lived in the
household of their grandparents.36
31. Maldonado, supra note 17, at 867.
32. Id. at 868.
33. "By 1965, 2.5 marriages per thousand people ended in divorce and the
next decade saw that rate virtually double." Joan Catherine Bohl, That "Thorny
Issue" Redux: California Grandparent Visitation Law in the Wake of Troxel v.
Granville, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 121, 127 (2006).
34. "By 1975, the people who had divorced were remarrying at a rate of
approximately 80% combining children from pervious marriages into a single
family and creating 'blended families."' Id. (citing to THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1987)).
35. Id. ("In 1950, 11.9% of married women with children under six years of
age worked outside the home. By 1965, that figure had more than doubled to
23.3%." By the end of 1970s, one-third of all married mothers with young
children worked outside the home.).
36. 530 U.S. 57, 63-64 (2000).
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In fact, most third-party visitation statutes prior to Troxel
limited standing to grandparents only, seemingly recognizing the
important role of grandparents within the modem-day American
family. Most of the aforementioned grandparent visitation statutes
"did not require evidence of preexisting relationships between
grandparents and their grandchildren" for standing to exist.37 This
"reflected the perception among legislatures, courts, and the public
that grandparents enjoy (or at least should enjoy) a 'unique and
nostalgic' place in the family."
38
In addition, seniors are a large and influential voting group.
Thus, grandparents have gained legal recognition "due in large part
to the wealthy and expansive seniors' lobby." 39 Indeed, after
Troxel the efforts of grandparent interest groups intensified. The
visibility of their websites increased. 40 A detailed book touted as
the "legal guide to protecting your relationship with your
grandchildren" was published with requirements for filing for
custody-not just visitation.41
While grandparents obviously enjoy an important role within
the family, the changing constitution of the American family also
led to the recognition of rights for other third parties outside the
traditional nuclear family: non-parent relatives, same sex co-
parents, stepparents, and foster parents.42 In the wake of the
medical community's acknowledgement of psychological
parenthood and the increasing importance of non-biological adult-
child relationships, visitation statutes were enacted that provided
standing to non-grandparent petitioners.
43
There has always been great diversity among third-party
visitation statutes. Some statutes allowed only grandparents to
37. Roberts, supra note 26, at 16.
38. Id. (citing to Anne Marie Jackson, The Coming of Age of Grandparent
Visitation Rights, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 563, 575-76 (1994)).
39. Tomaine, supra note 28, at 744.
40. See Aaron Larson, Grandparents' Rights to Visitation, EXPERTLAW.
COM, Sept. 2003, http://www.expertlaw.com/library/child-custody/grandparents
rights.html; Loma Davis Silcott, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Know Your
Options, Choose a Plan of Action, GRANDTIMES.COM, http://www.grandtimes.
com/visit.html; Advocates for Grandparent Grandchild Connection, http://
grandparentchildconnect.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
41. The book not only outlines the requirements of the law of all fifty states,
but provides parties with forms required by most courts. It is user-friendly with a
complete glossary of legal terms and is intended to be a tool for pro se clients.
"The purpose of this book is to help you secure visitation with, or obtain custody
of, your grandchildren without hiring a lawyer." TRAci TRULY, ATToRNEY AT
LAW-GRANDPARENTS' RIGHTS xi (3d ed. 2001).
42. Roberts, supra note 26.
43. Id.
93320091
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petition for visitation while other state statutes permitted any third-
party to petition for visitation." States also vary regarding the
standards courts use to decide whether third-party visitation is
appropriate. Some legislatures instruct courts to apply the "best
interests of the child" standard used in most cases involving minors
in family and juvenile courts.45 Other legislatures require the
petitioning party to show that "harm" will occur to the child if
visitation is not granted.46 Very few legislatures provide a list of
factors for courts to consider when determining whether to grant
visitation to a petitioner.47 After Troxel, the obvious conclusion was
that the laws would become more uniform. However, states continue
to drastically differ in their approaches to third-party visitation.
IV. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE
A. Facts
Brad Troxel and Tommie Granville, although never married,
lived together and had two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie. 48 In
June of 1991, Brad and Tommie ended their relationship, and Brad
moved in with his parents, Jenifer and Gary Troxel. Brad had
regular weekend visitation with his daughters, which meant his
parents, the paternal grandparents, also saw Isabelle and Natalie
during the regular visitation.49 In May of 1993, Brad committed
suicide. 50 After Brad's death the Troxels continued to have regular
weekend visitation with their granddaughters. In October of 1993,
Tommie informed the Troxels that she wanted to limit their
visitation to one visit per month. 51
B. Procedural History
In December of 1993, the Troxels petitioned for increased
visitation with Isabelle and Natalie under the Washington state
44. Compare ALA. CODE 1975 § 30-34.1 (Supp. 2008) with CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 2004).
45. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.065 (2006); CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. §
3104(b) (West 2004).
46. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (West 2006); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
47. Florida is one state that provides a list of factors via statute. See FLA.
STAT. § 752.01 (WEST 2003). Hawaii provides a list of factors via case law. See
Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d 1067 (Haw. 2007).
48. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 60-61.
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third-party visitation statute. 52 The statute provided that "any
person may petition for visitation rights at any time including, but
not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation
rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interests
of the child whether or not there has been any change in
circumstances., 53 The Troxels asked the court for two weekends of
overnight visitation per month and two weeks of summer
visitation. In response Granville asked the court for one day of
visitation per month.Y The trial court judge stated that "it is
normally in the best interests of the children to spend quality time
with the grandparent" and ordered one weekend of visitation per
month, one week of visitation during the summer, and four hours
of visitation on each of the petitioning grandparents' birthdays.55
Tommie Granville appealed the trial court's decision. He also
married Kelly Wynn during that time.56 The Washington Court of
Appeals remanded the decision to the trial court to enter written
findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the trial court
held that as long as visitation with the Troxels was balanced with
the time spent with the nuclear family, visitation was in Isabelle
and Natalie's best interests. 57 The court found "the Petitioners are
part of a large, central, loving family, all located in this area, and
the Petitioners can provide opportunities for the children in the
areas of cousins and music."M Nine months after the trial court's
decision on remand, Kelly Wynn, Tommie's new husband,
adopted Isabelle and Natalie.
The Washington Court of Appeals held that third parties did
not have standing under the visitation statute unless a custody
action was pending and, therefore, reversed the trial court and
dismissed the Troxels' petition for visitation.60 The Washington
Court of Appeals stated that limiting third-party visitation to
pending custody litigation was "consistent with the constitutional
restrictions on state interference with parents' fundamental liberty
52. Id. at 61; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1994),
invalidated by Troxel, 530 U.S. 57.
53. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61 (citing to WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.10.160(3)).
54. Id.
55. Id.; Petition of Certiorari at 68a, Troxel, 530 U.S. 5 (No. 99-138).
56. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 61-62 (citing Petition of Certiorari at 70a, Troxel, 530 U.S. 5 (No.
99-138)).
59. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 62.
60. Id.
2009]
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interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. ' 61
The court therefore decided the case purely on statutory grounds. 62
The Washington Supreme Court consolidated the case with two
other visitation cases and affirmed the decision below on
constitutional, not statutory, grounds. 63 The Washington Supreme
Court stated that while the Troxels had standing, the Washington
state visitation statute infringed on a parent's fundamental right to
rear their children under the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.64 The Washington Supreme Court stated that the
statute was unconstitutional on two grounds. First, the statute did
not require a showing of harm before infringing on the
fundamental right of parents to rear their children. Second, the
statute was entirely too broad in that it allowed "any person at any
time" to petition for visitation.
66
C. The Decision
The United States Supreme Court, in an uncharacteristic
alignment of six justices, voted to affirm the judgment of the
Washington Supreme Court denying visitation to the Troxels. In a
plurality opinion written by Justice O'Connor, she, along with
Justices Rehnquist, Ginsberg, and Breyer, agreed that the
Washington visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied to the
facts at hand.67 Justices Souter and Thomas agreed in the judgment
denying visitation but did not agree with the plurality's reasoning,
so each separately concurred. 68 Justices Stevens, Scalia, and
Kennedy dissented.69
As stated above, the plurality failed to extend its decision to
more than the Washington visitation statute as applied.7 °
Therefore, the holding is quite limited. Justice O'Connor stated
that because the statute was "breathtakingly broad" and allowed
"any person at any time" to petition for visitation, Tommie
Granville's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights
61. Id.; In re Visitation of Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 700 (Wash. Ct. App.
1997), amended, 954 P.2d 289 (Wash. Ct. App.), affd in part In re Smith, 969
P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998), aff'd Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
62. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 62.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 63.
65. Id. at 57.
66. Id. at 63.
67. Id. at 57.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 67.
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were violated.7' In granting visitation to the Troxels, the Court
interfered with Granville's fundamental right to the care, custody,
and control of her children.72 Citing to Pierce, Justice O'Connor
noted that "[t]he child is not a mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations." 7  In addition, there was no finding that Tommie
Granville was unfit.74 The lower state courts gave no weight to the
constitutionally recognized presumption that a parent is fit and acts
in a child's best interests. Instead, the trial court "judge placed the
burden on Granville, the fit custodial parent, the burden of
disproving that visitation would be in the best interests of her
children."' 7 In fact, "[t]he judge's comments suggest that he
presumed the grandparents' request should be granted unless the
children would be 'impact[ed] adversely. ,,76
Justice Souter argued for affirming the Washington State
Supreme Court decision in its entirety. "The issues that might well
be presented by reviewing a decision addressing the specific
application of the state statute by the trial court ... are not before
us and do not call for turning any fresh furrows in the 'treacherous
field' of substantive due process. 77 In other words, Justice Souter
argued the highest court of a state is better equipped to address the
application of that state's own statute, especially in an area like
domestic relations, which is ripe for the extension of substantive
due process rights.
While expressing no opinion on the issue, Justice Thomas
stated that neither party "argued that our substantive due process
cases were wrongly decided and that the original understanding of
the Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of
unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision."
78
Because substantive due process rights were not challenged,
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment and agreed that there is
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 65; Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
74. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.
75. Id.
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents
possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More
important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
76. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.
77. Id. at 75-76; Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
78. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80.
2009]
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a fundamental parental right to the care, custody, and control of
children.79 However, Thomas noted that the plurality, Justice
Souter, and Justice Kennedy recognized the fundamental right
without applying the appropriate standard of review-strict
scrutiny.
80
Justice Stevens believed the Court should have denied
certiorari in this case, stating this was an issue that should be left to
the state courts. 81 The Washington Supreme Court indicated that
the statute was unconstitutional, and the state legislature therefore
needed to redraft the statute. 82 However, Justice Stevens noted that
since the Court granted certiorari, it should find the statute
unconstitutional on its face and address all the federal questions
presented to the court.83 First, Justice Stevens noted that the Court
should not be involved in an independent fact assessment of the
case.8 4 Second, he stated that the standard used by the state courts
in such visitation disputes should be the best interests of the child,
not a harm threshold.85 Stevens noted that there will be some
instances where parental liberty will be outweighed by the best
interests of the child "because even a fit parent is capable of
treating a child like a mere possession. ' 86 Justice Stevens even
suggested that there are constitutionally protected children's rights
in that "it seems ... extremely likely that, to the extent parents and
families have fundamental liberty interests ... so, too, do children
have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in
the equation."
87
Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy both wrote brief dissents in
the case. Justice Scalia believed that such an issue should be left
entirely to the states, for it is not the role of the Court to interfere in
matters of family law. 88 While Justice Scalia obviously believed
that no fundamental parental right is enumerated in the
Constitution, he indicated that while he would "not now overrule"
the cases which recognize such a right, neither would he extend
those cases. 89 Justice Kennedy wrote that the case should be
remanded due to the portion of the Washington Supreme Court's
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 80-81.
83. Id. at 81.
84. Id. at 82.
85. Id. at 85-86.
86. Id. at 86.
87. Id. at 88.
88. Id. at 92.
89. Id.
938 [Vol. 69
PROPOSED POST-TROXEL SOLUTION
holding requiring harm.90 Kennedy asserted that this is not the
framework for a federal question. There is only a federal question
when the state court frames the issue more narrowly-as one
regarding a fundamental parental right to the care, custody, and
control of children.
91
D. Issues Troxel Addressed But Left Open
While the holding of Troxel v. Granville is quite narrow in that it
only found the Washington state visitation statute unconstitutional
as applied, Justice O'Connor wrote a lengthy plurality decision
addressing the many issues presented by the statute. Justice Stevens
recognized the extent of O'Connor's decision while she remained
indecisive when he stated,
[I] believe that we should confront the federal questions
presented directly. For the Washington statute is not made
facially invalid either because it may be invoked by too
many hypothetical plaintiffs, or because it leaves open the
possibility that someone may be permitted to sustain a
relationship with a child without having to prove that
serious harm to the child would otherwise result.
It is unknown what Justice O'Connor's reasoning was for
writing such a lengthy plurality opinion, which, in light of the
ultimate holding in the case, was mere dicta. However, the opinion
does provide guidance for state courts and legislatures.
First, the plurality opinion discussed the idea of parental
fitness. Justice O'Connor stated that the statute is overbroad
because there were no requirements that a parent be found unfit.
9 3
Given the presumption adopted in Parham v. JR. that a parent is
presumed fit and to act in a child's best interests, this is
unconstitutional.94 Since the holding in Troxel is only applicable to
the Washington statute, it is unclear whether there is a requirement
that a parent be found unfit for a third party to be granted
visitation. However, Justice O'Connor did state that the burden of
proving unfitness should fall on the petitioning party.95
Second, while the Washington Supreme Court held the statute
was unconstitutional because it did not require a showing of harm,
90. Id. at 95.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 81.
93. Id. at 68.
94. Id. at 69; 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).
95. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.
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O'Connor's plurality opinion failed to directly address the harm
requirement. Justice O'Connor wrote that "special circumstances"
may lead to the granting of visitation and suggests that situations
where "harm" to the child is at issue could be such a
circumstance. 96 In stating such, Justice O'Connor failed to indicate
whether best interest of the child or harm should be the standard
for petitions for visitation. The plurality also discussed other
"special circumstances" where visitation may be granted to a third
party. Other such circumstances include where there is an ongoing
relationship between a child and a third party and where the child
expresses a preference for visitation.97
Third, the plurality opinion discussed whether or not it is
relevant if the parent allows some visitation, but there is
disagreement with the third party as to the amount, and no
agreement is reached regarding the dispute.9 8 Justice O'Connor
even mentioned that some state statutes do not allow a court to
grant visitation unless a parent has clearly denied visitation.
99
After the Troxel opinion, all fifty states were left with third-
party visitation statutes of some kind. Many questions remained.
Was Troxel even relevant to individual state statutes since the
holding was only applied in the particular case? Or, were the
lengthy opinions in Troxel supposed to provide guidance to state
legislatures for their statutes to comply with the Constitution?
V. BUILDING A UNIFORM THIRD-PARTY VISITATION STATUTE
A. State Responses to Troxel
After Troxel, the majority of states waited for the challenges to
visitation statutes to play out in court. Either through appellate
court or supreme court decisions, twenty-one states found their
third-party visitation statutes to be constitutional.100 Only six states
96. Id. at 74.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 71.
99. Id.
100. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin all found their statutes to be constitutional. See L.B.S. v. L.M.S.,
826 So. 2d 178 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002); Evans v. Taggert, 88 P.3d 1078 (Alaska
2004); Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Crafton v.
Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d
292 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Galjour v. Harris, 795 So. 2d 350 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2001); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000); Blixt v. Blixt, 774
N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002); Soohoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 2007);
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found their third-party statutes facially unconstitutional.' 0' Nine
states found their third-party statutes unconstitutional as applied,
and fourteen states made no court determination regarding their
third-party visitation statutes.' 0 2 Even in those instances where
courts found third-party visitation statutes to be unconstitutional on
their face, state legislatures did not always subsequently respond.
The variety among the individual third-party visitation statutes
is even more apparent after Troxel. While most states limit third-
party visitation to grandparents, many include great-grandparents,
stepparents, siblings, and third parties who have a significant
relationship with the child. For those states that permit third-party
visitation, only some states define what is necessary to establish
the significant or existing relationship required. 10 3 Further, some
states do not rely on third-party visitation statutes to award
visitation; instead, they use the common law doctrines of de facto
parenthood, in loco parentis, or psychological parenthood. 10 4 I
Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 2001); Polasek v. Omura, 136 P.3d
519 (Mont. 2006); In re R.A. & J.M., 891 A.2d 564 (N.H. 2002); Williams v.
Williams, 50 P.3d 194 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Davis v. Davis, 725 N.Y. S.2d 812
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001); In re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721 (Or.
2004); Malone v. Stonerook, 843 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Griffin v.
Griffin, 581 S.E.2d 899 (Va. Ct. App. 2003); Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 S.E.2d
674 (W. Va. 2001); In re Paternity of Roger D.H., 641 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2002).
101. Only California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and Washington
found their statutes to be unconstitutional on their face. In Re Marriage of
Harris, 37 P.3d 379 (Cal. 2006); Forbes v. Chapin, 917 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Ct. App.
2005); Belair v. Drew, 776 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001); Wickham v.
Bryne, 769 N.E.2d 1 (I11. 2002); Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2001);
DeRose v. DeRose, 666 N.W.2d 636 (Mich. 2003); In re Paternity of Roger
D.H., 641 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
102. Arkansas, Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, and Vermont all found their statutes unconstitutional as
applied. Seagrave v. Price, 79 S.W.3d 339 (Ark. 2002); Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d
431 (Conn. 2002); Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs. v. Paillet, 16 P.3d 962 (Kan.
2001); Koshko v. Haining, 921 A.2d 171 (Md. Ct. App. 2007); Wilde v. Wilde,
775 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001); Neal v. Lee, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla. 2000);
Camburn v. Smith, 586 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 2003); Currey v. Currey, 650 N.W.2d
273 (S.D. 2002); Glidden v. Conley, 820 A.2d 197 (Vt. 2003).
103. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Louisiana, Virginia,
and Wisconsin have broad visitation statutes that permit visitation to third
parties more generally. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.065 (2006); CAL. FAM. CODE§ 3104 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 2004); DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (2006); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 571-46
(LexisNexis Supp. 2007); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(b) (1999); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-278.15 (West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.56 (West 2008).
104. See infra Part VI.
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addition, even though part of the ultimate holding in Troxel
articulated a longstanding constitutional presumption that a parent
is fit and acts in a child's best interests, twenty-one states do not
have such a presumption via statute or common law.'0 5 Most
statutes use a "best interests of the child" standard in third-party
visitation cases, but only some states provide factors to be
considered by the court,' 0 l6leaving the best interests standard open
to interpretation by individual courts. In addition, only a few states
require a showing of harm as discussed in Troxel.
0 7
B. Questions a Visitation Statute Should Answer
1. Definitions of Familial Relationships
First and foremost, third-party visitation statutes should
provide definitions of terms used within a statute. While it may
seem obvious, biological and legal relationships are often not
easily determined. Terms seemingly simple and well-understood-
such as grandparent, sibling, and parent-child relationship-must
be legally defined or left to open interpretation by the judiciary.
With the changing and often varying definition of the family,' 8
individual judges within the same locality may interpret familial
relationships quite differently.
Statutes should begin by defining a parental relationship as
"the child's biological mother or father or adoptive mother or
father."' 1 9 If the statute gives special standing, such as shorter time
requirements, to grandparents or other biological or adoptive
105. Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah,
and Wyoming have no court determinations regarding their third party
visitations statutes.
106. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
46b-59; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.509 (West 2003); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136(b);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-52 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1011 (1989); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 48-10-501 (West 2002); Dodd v. Burleson, 932 So. 2d 912
(Ala. Civ. App. 2005); Fairbanks v. McCarter, 622 A.2d 121 (Md. 1993).
107. Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky,
Tennessee, and Texas all require harm in addition to best interests of the child in
granting visitation to third parties. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (West
2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-302 (West Supp. 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 153.433 (Vernon Supp. 2008); Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d 1067 (Haw. 2007); In re
T.L.M., 852 A.2d 38 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003); Scott v. Scott, 80 S.W.3d 447 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2002).
108. See supra Part III.
109. Patricia S. Fernandez, Grandparent Access: A Model Statute, 6 YALE L.
&POL'Y REv. 109, 132 (1988).
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relatives, those relationships must be defined as well. Tennessee
and Oregon both provide a definition of grandparent. Oregon
merely defines grandparent as "the legal parent of the child's legal
parent, '' 10 while Tennessee provides more detail by stating that a
grandparent is either (1) a biological grandparent, (2) the spouse of
a biological grandparent, or (3) a parent of an adoptive parent." '
Oregon also goes so far as to define a "child-parent
relationship" as
[a] relationship that exists or did exist, in whole or in part,
within the six months preceding the filing of an action
under this section, and in which relationship a person
having physical custody of a child or residing in the same
household as the child supplied, or otherwise made
available to the child, food, clothing, shelter, and incidental
necessaries and provided the child with necessary care,
education and discipline, and which relationship continued
on a day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship,
interplay, mutuality, that fulfilled the child's psychological
needs for a parent as well as the child's physical needs.
However, a relationship between a child and a person who
is the nonrelated foster parent of the child is not a child-
parent relationship under this section unless the relationship
continued over a period exceeding 18 months.'
1 2
The statute does not have to provide definitions as an introduction
to statutes but may define terms by listing terms that a court "may"
consider in interpreting such terms.
13
2. Standing and Procedures for Petition
Should a statute be limited to grandparents or be more
expansive to include all third parties? Should a petitioning party,
including grandparents and other relatives, have to prove a prior
established relationship with the child? Currently, many statutes
only statutorily recognize grandparents as having standing to
petition for visitation. Due to the continued expansion of other
common law and equitable doctrines,1 14 legislation should define
all substantial or significant relationships and recognize third
110. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119 (West 2003).
111. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-302.
112. Id.
113. See infra Part VI.
114. See infra Part V1.
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parties, more generally, as qualifying for visitation. Tennessee
defines a "significant existing relationship" with a grandparent as:
(A) The child resided with the grandparent for at least six (6)
consecutive months; (B) The grandparent was a full-time
caretaker of the child for a period of not less than six (6)
consecutive months; or (C) The grandparents had frequent
visitation with the child who is the subject of the suit for a
period of not less than one (1) year."15
The same definition can be used for all third parties by
removing "grandparent" from the definition and including all third
parties with a significant relationship. Given the expanding
definition of the family, the law cannot continue to ignore the
developing role of non-relatives who serve in caretaking roles. If
this continues, the role of third parties, and their contributions to
the well-being of children, will be ignored.
Should third-party petitions be permitted if parents object to
visitation? Should third parties be allowed to petition at anytime,
or should a statute require an ongoing legal proceeding? The
constitutionally protected rights of parents cannot be ignored.
However, parental rights are not absolute. If both parents object to
visitation, the third-party petition should be dismissed. Michigan
provides that an affidavit from both parents will serve as grounds
for a dismissal of a third-party petition for visitation." 6 In addition,
the Court in Troxel held that parental rights were at issue because
the Washington state statute was so overbroad as to allow third
parties to petition at any time. 117 Many states began imposing
additional requirements if parents are in an intact marriage. For
example, California does not permit third-party visitation claims
while parents are married, unless one or more of the following
circumstances exist:
(1) The parents are currently living separately and part on a
permanent or indefinite basis. (2) One of the parents has
been absent for more than one month without the other
spouse knowing the whereabouts of the absent spouse. (3)
One of the parents joins in the petition with the grandparents.
(4) The child is not residing with either parent. (5) The child
has been adopted by a stepparent." 1
8
115. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-306(b)(1).
116. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b(5) (West Supp. 2008).
117. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000).
118. CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3104(b) (West 2004).
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An ongoing proceeding was not required. 119 While an ongoing
proceeding may show familial strife and provide grounds for state
intervention with familial privacy, compelling state interests-such
as child protection-often overcome the familial privacy interest.
The parental presumption is constitutionally required while a narrow
statute--only applicable during pending actions-is not.120 Post-
Troxel, many jurisdictions continue to allow third-party visitation
petitions to be filed at any time and should continue to do so.
12 1
States can protect against a burdensome number of third-party
petitions for visitation by requiring a change of circumstances,
which is a standard applied by most jurisdictions in custody cases.
As with a requirement for a "significant existing relationship," the
statute should define what qualifies as a material and substantial
change of circumstances. With a statute providing factors to define
"best interests of the child," there needs to be more judicial
deference with the statutory definition of "material and substantial
change." California provides excellent threshold factors that can be
used as permissive factors to determine "material and substantial
change.
'122
In addition, as a procedural protection, the statute should
require verified affidavits from the petitioning party or opposing
parents, so courts can easily dismiss claims that do not meet the
statutory requirements. Maine requires:
The grandparent must file with the petition for rights of
visitation or access an affidavit alleging a sufficient
existing relationship with the child, or that sufficient efforts
have been made to establish a relationship with the child.
119. Id.
120. The Supreme Court of Alaska refused to hold that the third party
visitation statute was unconstitutional. The Alaska statute was distinguishable
from the Washington state statute in Troxel. While the Alaska statute permitted
filing of a petition at any time, it was sufficiently narrow because it applied the
parental presumption and applied a clear and convincing evidence standard. See
Evans v. Taggart, 88 P.3d 1078 (Alaska 2004). See also In Re Marriage of
Harris, 96 P.3d 141 (Cal. 2004) (holding the statute facially constitutional due to
application of parental presumption even though filing of action was permitted
at anytime).
121. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (West 2007); CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. §
3104(b); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-1616 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (West 2006); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803 (Supp. 2008); MD. CODE. ANN. FAM. LAW § 9-102
(West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-52 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15, §
1011 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15 (2001); W. VA. CODE § 48-10-501
(2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 54.56 (West 2008).
122. See supra note 120 regarding In Re Marriage of Harris, 96 P.3d at 143
and accompanying text.
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When the petition and accompanying affidavit are filed
with the court, the grandparent shall serve a copy of both
on at least one of the parents or legal guardians of the
child.' 23
In addition, the Maine statute calls for an affidavit from
protesting parents when necessary stating: "The parent or legal
guardian of the child may file an affidavit in response to the
grandparent's petition and accompanying affidavit. When the
affidavit in response is filed with the court, the parent or legal
guardian shall deliver a copy to the grandparent." 2 4
Again, this protects courts from an inundation of third-party
visitation claims. Courts do not then have to address the merits of
the case, but only the existence of a significant or substantial
relationship. 1
25
3. Standard
States must determine what standard is appropriate for third-
party visitation cases. All jurisdictions currently use some form of
the 'best interests of the child" standard in third-party visitation
cases. However, the "best interests of the child" standard varies
greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. If the "best interests"
standard is used, states should err on the side of legislative clarity
and provide factors within the statute itself. Some states allow for
little judicial deference. For example, Alabama provides:
(1) The willingness of the grandparent or grandparents to
encourage a close relationship between the child and the
parent or parents. (2) The preference of the child, if the
child is determined to be of sufficient maturity to express a
preference. (3) The mental and physical health of the child.
(4) The mental and physical health of the grandparents. (5)
Evidence of domestic violence inflicted by one parent upon
the other parent or the child. If the court determines that
evidence of domestic violence exists, visitation provisions
shall be made in a manner protecting the child or children,
parents, or grandparents from further abuse. (6) Other
123. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(2)(A).
124. Id. As stated previously Michigan also requires the filing of an affidavit
when filing the motion or complaint for visitation. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.27b(5) (West Supp. 2008).
125. See Robichaud v. Pariseau, 820 A.2d 1212 (Me. 2003) (holding that an
evidentiary hearing is not required before dismissing a grandparent's petition for
lack of standing).
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relevant factors in the particular circumstances, including
the wishes of any parent who is living.1
26
Other states define best interests while giving the courts room
for interpretation. Arkansas provides a less exhaustive list of
factors but clearly identifies harm:
(1) The petitioner has the capacity to give the child love,
affection, and guidance; (2) The loss of the relationship
between the petitioner and the child is likely to harm the
child; and (3) The petitioner is willing to cooperate with the
custodian if visitation with the child is allowed. 1
27
The best way to create a balance of power-and requiring more
from a court than simple mechanics-is to provide a base of best
interests of the child factors and allowing for further judicial
interpretation.
Many states require a harm determination in addition to
determining the best interests of the child, 128 while others include
126. ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.1(d) (Supp. 2008). Arizona also provides a laundry
list of best interests factors, which are not as easily defined:
[T]he historical relationship, if any, between the child and the person
seeking visitation; the motivation of the requesting party in seeking
visitation; the motivation of the person denying visitation; the quantity
of visitation time requested and the potential adverse impact that
visitation will have on the child's customary activities; if one or both of
the child's parents are dead, the benefit in maintaining an extended
family relationship.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (West 2007).
Michigan also has a laundry list of factors:
(a) Love, affection and other emotional ties between the grandparent
and the child. (b) Length and quality of the relation between the child
and the grandparent, the role performed by the grandparent, and the
existing emotional ties of the child to the grandparent. (c) The
grandparent's moral fitness. (d) The grandparent's mental and physical
health. (e) The child's reasonable preference. (f) The effect on the child
of hostility between the grandparent and the parent of the child. (g) The
willingness of the grandparent to encourage the child and the parent or
parents of the child. (h) Any history, emotional, sexual abuse or neglect
of any child by the grandparent. (i) Whether the parent's decision to
deny, or lack of an offer of, grandparent time is related to the child's
wellbeing or is for some other unrelated reason. (j) Any other factor
relevant to the physical and psychological well-being of the child.
MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b(5).
127. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
128. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59
(West 2004); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. §
19-7-3 (West 2003); Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d 1067 (Haw. 2007); Scott v. Scott, 80
S.W.3d 447 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).
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harm as one of many best interests factors. 129 The plurality in
Troxel advocates for a harm standard (by referring to the decision
below by the Washington Supreme Court). 130 Even if harm is used
in a best interests analysis, the statute should provide a definition
of harm. For example, Oklahoma provides that the definition of
harm or potential harm is "a showing that without court-ordered
visitation by the grandparent, the child's emotional, mental or
physical well-being could reasonably or would be jeopardized."'131
Oregon refers to harm in a different manner but provides for a
similar definition in stating "circumstances detrimental to a child
includes but is not limited to circumstances which may cause
psychological, emotional or physical harm."' 32 A harm standard
should not be looked at separate and apart from best interests of the
child as often the two are one in the same and are construed from
the exact same set of facts. A "best interests of the child" definition
-whether created via statute or common law-should incorporate
a definition of harm in conjunction with other factors.
In addition, a third-party visitation statute should include an
evidentiary standard. It is obvious that the burden of proof should
be on the petitioning party as they are seeking to intervene-or
interfere-with the parent-child relationship. Also, while some
states have adopted a preponderance standard, 133 this is contrary to
the parental rights decisions that create a higher threshold for the
primary or higher "tiered" parent. 134 Most states have correctly
deciphered these parental rights decisions and adopted a clear and
convincing standard in third-party visitation statutes.
13 5
4. Parental Fitness Presumption
Last, a state must determine whether a biological or legal
parent is presumed fit. Troxel makes it clear that to comply with
the fundamental constitutional right of parental control, a state
visitation statue must include a presumption that a parent is fit and
129. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103.
130. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 74 (2000).
131. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 2007).
132. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (2003).
133. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 1031; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433
(Vernon Supp. 2008).
134. Adam K. Ake, Unequal Rights: The Fourteenth Amendment and De
Facto Parentage, 81 WASH. L. REV. 787, 787 (2006). See also Devine v.
Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Jones v. Boring, 884 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2005).
135. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-117 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-59 (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (West 2003); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-719 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15 (West 2001).
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acts in a child's best interests.' 36 While the majority of states that
have parental presumptions of fitness do so via statute, eight states
created a parental presumption through common law after the
Troxel decision.' 37 Therefore, a constitutionally sound state law
must provide for a parental presumption of fitness. However,
Troxel does not go so far as to state whether such a presumption
may be rebutted, and if so, through what means. Given the growing
role of third parties within the current familial structure, it is only
practical that a state law provide for the rebuttal of parental fitness.
In Virginia, "[t]he court shall give due regard to the primacy of the
parent-child relationship but may upon showing by clear and
convincing evidence that the best interests of the child would be
served thereby award custody or visitation to any other person with
a legitimate interest."'
' 38
A standard for overcoming the constitutional presumption that
a parent is fit and acts in a child's best interests should be higher.
In Illinois, the party filing must prove that the parent's actions and
decision regarding visitation times are harmful to the child's
mental, physical, or emotional health.' 39 It thereby establishes a
harm standard to overcome the presumption. Vermont also uses a
harm standard to rebut the presumption: "To prove parental
unfitness the grandparent must prove that the parent's actions or
failure to grant grandparent visitation will cause the child
significant harm by adversely affecting the child's health, safety,
or welfare; this standard is similar to the standard for establishing
abuse and neglect.'
140
Looking at the list of well-drafted third-party visitation
statutes, there is an argument for the adoption of a uniform statute.
Even with all of the aforementioned statutes, not one state statute
provides answers to all of the questions that are needed for a
navigable legislation.
136. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 74 (2000).
137. See McCune v. Frey, 783 N.E.2d 752 (Ind. 2003); Camburn v. Smith,
586 S.E.2d 565 (S.C. 2003); Glidden v. Conley, 820 A.2d 197 (Vt. 2003);
Lindsie D.I. v. Richard W.S., 591 S.E.2d 308 (W. Va. 2003); Roth v. Weston,
786 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002); Wood v. Wood, 835 So. 2d 568 (La. 2002); Blixt v.
Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002); Dodd v. Burleson, 932 So. 2d 912 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2005).
138. VA. CODEANN. § 16.1-278.15.
139. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607 (West 2009).
140. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 1011(1989).
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VI. A STATE LOOPHOLE TO TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
Without consistent and thorough state third-party visitation
statutes, courts continue to circumvent parental constitutional
rights in favor of third parties by using other legal doctrines. In
fact, states often "looked to authority under existing third-party
visitation statutes to mandate the continuation of the relationship"
with third parties seeking custody or visitation "despite the
objection of the legal parent."' 41 The most commonly used
doctrine is that of de facto parenthood, which has long been
recognized by most courts.
A de facto custodian is defined as a person who has taken over
the role of parent as "caregiver, provider, and guardian"-
physically and psychologically." 42 However, "[t]he courts have not
applied functional parenthood to legalize the parent-child
relationship. Rather, the courts have used the functional
parenthood doctrine merely as a means of preserving a visitation
relationship."' 143 Given the growing number of children born to
same-sex parents, de facto parenthood is a useful doctrine by
which the parental rights of non-biological parents can be
recognized.' But the doctrine will continue to be misused in
determinations for visitation-as opposed to more complex
custody decisions-when a third-party visitation statute is non-
existent or inadequate. 145 The functional parenthood and de facto
parenthood doctrines do not address the more significant issue of
recognizing the co-parent as a legal parent in the eyes of the law. 146
Most parents are then "relegated to third-party status, resulting in
both [the party] and [the] child failing to receive any legal benefits
of parenthood."' 147 With more limited use of the de facto parent or
psychological parent doctrines, we are more likely to see the legal
recognition of same-sex parents.
141. See Ake, supra note 134, at 788.
142. Elizabeth Ashley Bruce, Note, A Parent's Right Under the Fourteenth
Amendment: Does Kentucky's De Facto Custodian Statute Violate Due
Process?, 92 KY. L.J. 529, 530 (2004) (citing KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §
403.270(1)(b) (West 2002)).
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144. Id.
145. See generally William Turner, The Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard
in Holtzman v. Knott: Judicial Policy Innovation and Confusion, 22 BERKELEY
J. GENDER L. & JUST. 135 (2007).
146. Brooke Silverthorn, When Parental Rights and Children's Best Interests
Collide: An Examination ofTroxel v. Granville as it Relates to Gay and Lesbian
Families, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 893, 910-11 (2003).
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The use of the de facto doctrine presents many constitutional
problems that are contrary to the Court's holding in Troxel. "[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment limits the extent to which courts can
intrude on the parental rights of a natural or adoptive parent in an
attempt to provide remedies for non-parent partners, who are
usually legal strangers to the applicable statutory scheme.' 48 If a
court only determines whether parties meet the de facto parenthood
definition necessary to bring a petition, they can award custody to
those parties meeting the definition and avoid a thorough analysis
of best interests of the child or harm to the child. Without
addressing the merits of the case, the courts are then giving de
facto parents the same constitutional protections as biological or
adoptive parents. Again, this blatantly ignores longstanding
constitutional principles-which favor biological parents-
reiterated in Troxel. 149'
The Court's decisions regarding parental rights, "over time,"
have come to identify at least two "distinct tiers of parental
rights."' 5° In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
and Reform, the Court did not decide whether foster parents have
fundamental parental rights, only stating in dicta that recognizing
such rights "would conflict with the return to their biological
parents."' 151 In Quilloin v. Walcott, a father challenged a Georgia
state law that required only the mother's consent for adoption of
children born outside of marriage. The Court upheld the Georgia
law distinguishing an unmarried father from a married father. The
Court specifically stated that an unmarried father has less
constitutional protection in "that the State could permissibly give
appellant less veto authority than it provides to a married
father.' ' 152 "Troxel makes it clear that there are limits to the claims
grandparents may assert where such claims conflict with a fit,
upper-tier parent."' 153 This is also clear in the above line of cases.
The danger of de facto parenthood is that it gives a third party
parent-like--or legal-custodian-like-status in simple visitation
cases. Unlike the common law doctrine of de facto parenthood, a
third-party visitation statute does not give parties awarded
visitation a new status as a parental equivalent. The statute only
recognizes the importance of the third party's relationship with the
child. While these third parties now have legally recognized rights
148. Turner, supra note 137.
149. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).
150. Ake, supra note 134, at 791.
151. Id. at 793 (citing Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977)).
152. Id. at 794 (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978)).
153. Id. at 800.
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and duties because of their relationship with a child, this right is
more akin to the second-tier status recognized by the Supreme
Court in Smith154 and Quilloin.'5 Visitation rights in no way give a
third party a fundamental parental right as the de facto parent
doctrine does. 15
6
VII. CONCLUSION: PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR THIRD-PARTY
VISITATION
The problems created by the diverse nature of state statutes
regarding third-party visitation are apparent. In an increasingly mobile
society, many family law practitioners and judges deal with
jurisdictional issues on a daily basis. Even when a judge can solve the
jurisdictional issues present in any given case, statute variation may
lead to forum shopping when family conflicts over visitation ensue.
The same problems regarding great variation amongst state statutes
existed mere decades ago in both custody and child support cases. In
response to such problems, states adopted the Uniform Child Custody
and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act1 7 and the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act. 58 This recognizes that the federalization of
family law debate continues, and a simple uniform statute-in
another area in which children's interests are at the center of the
case-can solve the widely misapplied decision in Troxel.
My proposal for a uniform third-party visitation statute is as
follows:
1) Any party may file a petition or motion for visitation with an
unmarried minor child in a pending action for divorce, custody,
or visitation involving such minor child or where there has
been a material and substantial change in circumstances for the
minor child.
a) If the party requesting visitation is alleging a material and
substantial change in circumstances, a verified affidavit shall
be filed with the initial pleadings detailing such material and
substantial change.
b) In determining whether a material and substantial change
exists, the court may consider the following:
i) The parents are now living separately and apart on a
permanent or indefinite basis;
154. 431 U.S. 816.
155. 434 U.S. 246.
156. Ake, supra note 134, at 796.
157. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 202 (1997).
158. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (2001) (implemented by 42
U.S.C. § 666 (2000)).
952 [Vol. 69
PROPOSED POST-TROXEL SOLUTION
ii) One of the parents has been absent for more than one
month without the other spouse knowing the whereabouts
of the absent spouse;
iii) One of the parents joins in the petition with the
grandparents;
iv) The child is no longer residing with either parent; and
v) The child has been adopted by a stepparent.
2) The party requesting visitation must establish that a substantial
relationship exists with the unmarried minor child and that the
continuation of this relationship is in the child's best interests.
a) The party requesting visitation must state facts evidencing
such a substantial relationship in a verified affidavit that shall
be filed with the initial pleadings.
b) If both parents submit verified affidavits opposing
visitation with the petitioning party, the court shall dismiss the
petition for visitation unless there are material facts at issue
which relate to determination of fitness as addressed in § 3
below.
c) In determining whether a substantial relationship exists, the
court may consider the following:
i) Whether the petitioning party resided or recently
resided with the child;
ii) Whether the petitioning party has been granted
visitation with the unmarried minor child prior to the third
party petition or motion. Visitation shall be defied as both
possession, unsupervised visitation, and access, supervised
visitation; and
iii) Whether the petitioning party provided for the physical
and psychological needs of the child in addition to or in
lieu of the biological or adoptive parent.
3) If an evidentiary hearing is held on this matter, the court shall
presume that the fit parent has acted in the child's best interests
with regard to visitation with the third party. The court may
consider the following factors in determining whether the
presumption is overcome:
a) Whether the legal parent is unwilling or unable to care for
the child;
b) Whether the child is the subject of abuse or neglect by the
legal parent;
c) Whether denial of visitation would result in physical or
psychological harm to the child; and/or
d) The preference of the child, if the child is of an age to
freely form and express such a preference.
4) The third party filing the petition or motion for visitation with
an unmarried minor child shall bear the burden of proof.
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While many practitioners, judges, and scholars may disagree
with my proposal due to the resistance to the "federalization of
family law," it is becoming a common practice for states to adopt
uniform statutes due to jurisdictional and conflict of laws issues.
My proposal for a uniform third-party visitation statute is not one
that interferes with separation of powers or state sovereignty
issues, but is a mere suggestion for state courts and legislatures that
are struggling to make sense of a muddled United States Supreme
Court decision and subsequent confused responses.
